The proliferation of media outlets and the audience fragmentation it brings with it raises important questions for democratic publics. Scholars and pundits worry that news increasingly tailored to individual tastes will polarize the public (e.g., Sunstein, 2001) . As individuals have greater choice among media outlets narrowcasted to particular market niches, they may encounter more information that confirms their opinions and less that challenges their beliefs, while the pool of commonly shared information shrinks. Although citizens have long sought out information that reinforces their political predispositions (e.g., Lazarsfeld, et al., 1944; Berelson, et al., 1954) , citizens now have greater ability to avoid news sources they tend to disagree with and rely on sources they trust.
Religious media are one type of specialized, narrowcasted media that may be polarizing the electorate. Given the much vaunted role of "values voters" in the 2004 election and the ongoing "culture wars," understanding the role of religion in general and religious media in particular in American politics is increasingly necessary. 1 We explore religious media's political role by asking two questions in the context of the 2000 presidential and congressional elections.
First, who relies on religious media for political cues? Second, what is the relationship between such use and political behavior?
We present four major findings. First, almost a quarter of the public claims to rely on religious media when making voting decisions. Second, religious media users tended to feel closer to presidential candidates George W. Bush and Pat Buchanan and farther from Al Gore, and were more likely to vote for George W. Bush and Republican candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives compared to those who did not rely on religious media. Third, these relationships appear to reflect more than selection effects. Religious and political conservatives are most likely to use religious media, raising the possibility that religious media have little Stout and Buddenbaum, 1996) , investigations of religious media's political relevance are rare (e.g., Jelen & Wilcox, 1993; Mobley, 1984) . However, there are strong theoretical reasons to expect religious media to play a significant political role. Two bodies of research, one outlining the connections between religion and politics and the other detailing the influence of mass media in contemporary politics, combine to suggest that religious media may shape the political behavior of a significant part of American society. Moreover, research consistently finds that religion is an important aspect of contemporary American politics, strongly shaping current political alignments (e.g., Wilcox, 2000; Layman, 2001; Guth et al., 2006) . 2 Political conflict is so deeply divided along religious lines that some have argued that the U.S. is in the throes of a culture war (e.g., Hunter, 1991 ; but see Fiorina, et al., 2006; Williams, 1997) . Although descriptions of the culture war often point to religious media as a potent force in rallying troops (e.g., Guth, 1983; Wilcox, 2000) , relatively little is known about the political impact of these media (Jelen & Wilcox, 1993 ). Here we focus on religious media's role in one aspect of a potential culture war-citizens' views of political candidates and their ultimate vote choices.
Theoretical Expectations
We might expect religious media to be politically relevant for one obvious reason: secular media powerfully influence political attitudes and electoral behavior (e.g., Ansolabehere, Behr, & Iyengar 1993; Bartels, 1993; Graber, 1997; Zaller, 1992) . In fact, Zaller (1992) argues that information funneled through media elites can shape political opinions as much as do longstanding and deeply rooted political values. Recent studies have also found that nontraditional media sources like "soft news" programs can have significant political impact (e.g., Baum, 2005; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006) . These findings suggest that religious media may also be politically significant. Importantly, even though individuals may not consume nontraditional media sources intending to gain political information, they may encounter politically relevant information as a by-product of their attention to these sources (Baum, 2005) . Thus, religious media's political influence may not depend on individuals explicitly seeking out religiously based political information. Although some may do so, many users are attracted to religious media for its religious or entertainment value rather than for political cues (Abelman 1990 ). Even these individuals may receive political cues as a by-product of exposure to religious media. Simply put, since secular media shape political behavior and attitudes, we might expect religious media to do the same.
Two additional factors may enhance religious media's political power: religious media can connect religion to politics and religious media's audience is most likely open to influence.
First, religious media may play a part in linking religion to political views and activities.
Religious beliefs form a fundamental part of an individual's worldview, thereby shaping political thinking. Beliefs about the divine, human nature, the origin of the universe, and the sanctity of life can shape views on topics like abortion rights, education, criminal justice, and the death penalty. In fact, scholars have demonstrated the links between religious beliefs and policy attitudes toward everything from the environment to the Soviet Union to Israel to defense spending (Guth et al., 1995 Guth & Green, 1993; Hurwitz, Peffley, & Seligson, 1993) .
Religious leaders may play a profound role in linking religious beliefs to politics. It is often unclear how such beliefs should connect with contemporary political issues. The average individual may be unmotivated or unable to make these connections. However, religious leaders can and do make those connections explicit (Beatty & Walter, 1989) . One way to do so is from the pulpit in religious services. Religious media offer another venue for making these links. In fact, religious media do carry political messages (Abelman & Pettey, 1988 stances on abortion policy, the personal religious beliefs of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, the ways those beliefs might shape their actions in office, and religious leaders' policy requests for presidential hopefuls. In addition, some candidates turn to religious media to connect and communicate with particular types of potential voters (Murray, 2006) .
Second, the likely connections between religious media and their audience should enhance their political influence. Since consumers select their media sources, we expect that they generally share their media sources' beliefs and have some sense of connection to them.
Empirically, studies have found at least some religious conservatives seek out information that matches their beliefs (e.g., Buddenbaum, 1982; Hamilton & Rubin, 1992 ; see . To the extent that consumers feel connected to a media source, they will tend to view those sources as credible and trustworthy (e.g., Gunther, 1992) . Since information that comes from trusted sources is the most persuasive (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1998, p. 344-5) , religious media may be especially influential. Therefore, when religious leaders claim connections between religious beliefs and political action, their followers are likely to accept those messages. As Wald, Owen, and Hill (1988, p. 533 ) point out, "because of the high esteem in which churches are held and the voluntary nature of membership, any political messages transmitted by church authorities are likely at least to receive a respectful hearing, to enjoy substantial credibility, and potentially to alter opinions." In summary, we expect a relationship between religious media and political attitudes and behavior because religious media may be an important mechanism connecting religion and politics and because the political cues offered in religious media are likely to be favorably received by many who are exposed to them.
Despite reasons to expect religious media to be influential, studies of religious media effects are few in number and inconclusive in results. Anecdotal evidence suggests that religious media matter. Guth (1983) claims that the rise of religious media in the late 1970s was a major factor in resurrecting politically dormant conservative Christians to political activity. Media personalities, like Dobson and Robertson, have paralyzed Capitol Hill by asking listeners and viewers to call or fax their representatives (Doherty, 1993) . However, most systematic studies are skeptical. Televangelists appear to have little effect on political behavior, especially voting (Mobley, 1984; Hadden, 1990) . In fact, Jelen and Wilcox (1993, p. 265) found no evidence of a correlation between viewing religious television and presidential vote choice in 1988, leading them to conclude that "in general, religious television…affects attitudes only on issues of personal or social morality." Gaddy (1984) provides some dissent, noting that religious media users are more accepting of religious political activism.
In contrast to findings of religious media's minimal effects, our study may find larger effects for three reasons. First, extant studies of religious media focused on television and did not examine other media. We examine religious television, radio, and publications. Second, recent history has likely exacerbated the culture war mentality on all sides of the conflict, potentially boosting religious media's impact beyond what it was in the 1980s, when earlier studies were conducted. The 1992 through 2004 elections and the impeachment of Bill Clinton inflamed combatants, perhaps making them more likely to search for information they can trust and less likely to rely on information from contradictory sources. Third, we have access to measures of individual level reliance on religious media for political purposes. Where previous studies generally measure exposure to various media outlets, our measure taps the political use of religious media. These measures allow us to explore the level and extent of political use of religious media, and the relationship between this use and political behavior and attitudes.
Before moving to the analysis, we note that as is often the case in media studies, selection issues pose a challenge in our study. We have long known that individuals tend to select media sources that generally reinforce their political predispositions (e.g., Lazarsfeld, et al., 1944; Berelson, et al., 1954) . Thus, we expect reliance on religious media to be related to other religious and political factors. For example, Republican Evangelicals may choose to consume religious media precisely because they are Republican Evangelicals and prefer media that reinforce those predispositions. We meet this challenge in two ways. First, if reliance on religious media merely taps these other factors, controlling for them should render religious media politically insignificant. On the other hand, if religious media, like secular media, independently shape political attitudes and behavior, religious media use will remain politically significant even when other political and religion variables are taken into account. Second, we take advantage of our data's panel structure to control for predispositions directly.
Data and Measures
To answer our two questions, we use the Third National Survey of Religion and Politics, conducted in 2000 by the Survey Research Center at the University of Akron. The critical variables are drawn from post-election questions about the importance of various potential sources of information for respondents' voting decisions. 3 The survey asked the 2,925 postelection respondents how important three secular media sources (radio news, newspapers, and television news) and three religious media sources (religious TV, religious radio, and religious publications) were in their voting decisions (see appendix for details on all variables). 4 In each case, respondents were asked whether the source was "not at all important," "of some importance," or "very important" (coded 0, 1, and 2). These questions are explicitly political.
Respondents are not asked whether they watch religious television, but how important it was in making vote decisions. Thus, these measures tap a connection between media and politics.
When asking who uses religious media, we ask who is exposed to these media and who relies on them when making political decisions. (Kleppner, 1979) . Today, some scholars in this vein focus on "religious traditions," groups of religious communities sharing a set of beliefs, practices, and historical and organizational ties that generate a distinctive worldview Although religious traditions remain politically distinctive, recent decades brought major changes that cut across these traditions. According to some sociologists of religion, theological, social, and cultural disputes have divided traditions into "conservative" or "orthodox" factions pitted against "liberal" or "progressive" factions in a culture war (e.g., Hunter, 1991; Wuthnow, 1988) . So deep are these divisions that "orthodox" Evangelicals may have more in common with "orthodox" Catholics than with "progressive" Evangelicals.
We employ Guth et al's (2005 Guth et al's ( , 2006 religious classification scheme that incorporates both religious traditions and this theological restructuring. This scheme places each respondent into a single category, creating a series of indicator variables for each category. The measure begins by assigning individuals to religious traditions and then uses reports of religious beliefs, behaviors, and identifications with religious movements to divide the three most populous white traditions (Evangelical, Mainline, and Catholic) into three camps roughly associated with sociologists' orthodox and progressive division (e.g., in this scheme "traditionalists" are most orthodox, 7 "modernists" are most progressive, and "centrists" are in between). Those claiming no religious affiliation are referred to as "seculars." Some seculars report residual religious beliefs or behaviors and are classified "religious seculars" as opposed to "pure seculars" who have no religious traits. 8 This classification captures a great many nuances in the current religious-political landscape (Guth et al., 2006) , and relies on several measures (see the appendix for greater detail). Aside from this classification, we also analyzed a number of different operationalizations of religious belief, behavior, and belonging. Results from other strategies are similar to those reported here.
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We also control for political predispositions, namely party identification and political ideology (coded 0 to 6, Republican and conservative higher). Thus, we can see how Republicans or conservatives who rely on religious media differ from other Republicans or conservatives.
This is important because religion and politics research confronts the persistent problem of maintaining significant relationships in the face of typical political control variables (Hood & Smith, 2002) . Each model also controls for other potential influences like political knowledge, reliance on secular media, and demographic variables (education, income, race, gender, and age).
Unfortunately, we do not know which specific sources individuals were referring to when they claimed these media informed their voting decision. Our ignorance about the specific sources respondents used necessarily limits what we can expect about the specific relationships between religious media use and political attitudes and behavior. Since religious media sources run the political spectrum from relatively liberal (e.g., Sojourners magazine) to relatively conservative (e.g., 700 Club), we cannot form strong expectations. However, the majority of political content in religious media appears to have a conservative cast (Abelman & Pettey, 1987; Abelman & Neuendorf, 1985; Gormley, 2005; Gross, 1990) . Thus, we expect that religious media use might be related to greater support for the Republican Party and its candidates. Note, however, that prior studies focus on religious television, so they may not offer a clear indication of the ideological or partisan perspective across all religious media at the present time. Thus, we hold this expectation loosely. Analytically, the possibility that some respondents relied on more politically liberal or moderate cues while others relied on conservative cues might attenuate the relationship between religious media use and political variables. Thus, if we find significant results with imperfect measures, we can be fairly confident that religious media use is indeed related to political attitudes and behavior.
Results Table 1 provides an overview of which religious groups rely on religious media when making political decisions. Although much more of the public reported relying on secular media (87 percent), a significant portion of the sample, 23 percent, said at least one religious media source was of at least some importance to their voting decision (see the first two columns). This significant minority highlights the importance of assessing religious media's political impact.
An information source affecting almost one in four Americans requires some attention.
[ Table 1 about here]
Not all groups were equally likely to rely on religious media. More Evangelicals (especially traditionalist Evangelicals), black Catholics, and Hispanic and black Protestants used religious media than other groups, with over 30 percent in those traditions relying on at least one religious media source (although the small sample of Hispanic Protestants and black Catholics requires caution in drawing inferences). In addition, traditionalist Evangelicals, Mainliners, and
Catholics were more likely to rely on religious media than were centrists or modernists from their own traditions. These traditionalists make up almost half (44%) of the group that relied on religious media. At the other end of the spectrum, less than 5 percent of those claiming no religious identity (pure seculars) used religious media.
Although religious media users are numerous, the lion's share of them rely on religious media to supplement secular media sources. Almost everyone (around 90 percent) who relied on religious media also relied on at least one secular media source. However, some do rely more on religious media than secular media. Table 1 breaks down the balance of reliance on media sources. Summing reliance on each of the secular media sources and each of the religious media sources shows that the vast majority (77 percent) depended more on secular sources, meaning they did not use religious media at all or on balance, religious media were less important than secular media. Around five percent relied on both media types equally, and just over six percent relied more heavily on religious media. Traditionalist Evangelicals and mainliners were most likely to rely on religious media more extensively than secular media. Hispanic and black
Catholics can be added to this list, but only tentatively given their small sample sizes.
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Religious media use is also related to basic political orientations. Figure 1 demonstrates that a greater percentage of political conservatives relied on religious media than political liberals. One in three very conservative respondents used religious media, compared to about 14 percent of all types of liberals. Similarly, just under 15 percent of very conservative respondents relied more on religious media than secular media, as did 6 or 7 percent of slightly conservative and conservative leaners. This compares to fewer than 2 percent of very liberal respondents and 5 percent of slightly liberal respondents.
11
[ Figure 1 about here]
To begin investigating religious media's political impact, we examine respondents'
evaluations of how close they felt to Bush, Gore, and Buchanan, with five possible answers ranging from very close to very far. 12 In these models our measure of religious media use is the sum of the religious media variables (creating a 0-6 scale, Cronbach's alpha = .85).
We first establish a baseline for the relationship between religious variables and these evaluations (see Table 2 , columns 1, 4, 7). As expected given extant research, some Evangelicals, Mormons, and some Mainline Protestants were significantly closer to Bush and Buchanan and farther from Gore than the comparison group, Catholic centrists. In contrast, black Catholics were significantly farther from Buchanan, black Protestants significantly farther from Bush and Jews significantly farther from Bush and Buchanan and closer to Gore than the comparison group. Traditionalists in all three major traditions were significantly closer to Bush (Catholic traditionalists at p < .10, two-tailed test). Evangelical and Mainline traditionalists were also closer to Buchanan and farther from Gore than centrist Catholics. In contrast, Mainline modernists were significantly closer to Gore and Catholic modernists were significantly farther from Bush (p < .10). As expected, more Republican respondents felt closer to Bush and farther from Gore, while more conservative respondents were closer to Bush and Buchanan and farther from Gore than their more liberal counterparts.
[ Table 2 about here]
Having established this baseline, we can no ask whether religious media use has any additional effect. The answer is clearly yes. As Table 2 , columns 2, 5, and 8 show, compared to non-users, religious media users were up to about half a point closer to Bush, a third of a point closer to Buchanan, and a third of a point farther from Gore on these five-point scales. This relationship with candidate evaluation also carried over into actual vote choices. Table 3 presents results of probit models of the probability of voting for Bush and Republicans in elections for the House of Representatives. 13 Again, column 1 sets the baseline of religion's connection to voting behavior. As column 2 shows, after controlling the political and religious factors, religious media use was still related to voting for Bush, but only at the .10 level (two-tailed test). For the average individual, relying as heavily as possible on religious media would have boosted the probability of voting for Bush by about 28 percentage points. 14 In contrast, the heaviest reliance on secular media was associated with about a 19 point drop in the probability of a Bush vote. Column 5 shows that religious media users were also about 30 percentage points more likely to vote for Republican House candidates than non-users, while secular media users were about 15 points less likely to vote for Republicans in House races.
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[ Table 3 about here]
These results raise the possibility that religious media can help explain the long observed connection between religion and politics in the mass public. We can test whether this is true. In statistical parlance, we can conclude that religious media use mediates the relationship between the religious categories we employ and voting behavior if 1) membership in religious categories is related to voting behavior, 2) membership in religious categories is related to religious media use, and 3) controlling for religious media use attenuates the relationship between religious categories and voting behavior (Baron & Kenny, 1986) .
We have already seen that condition 1 is met (see Table 2 , columns 1, 4, and 7; Table 3 , columns 1 and 4), as is condition 2 (see Table 2 ). We can test condition 3 by comparing the coefficients for the religious groups in models that do and do not include religious media use.
For example, in linkages. Therefore, we control for respondents' general sense of the importance of their place of worship in their voting decisions (coded as the other importance items described above).
More specifically, clergy may be drawing the connections between religious beliefs and political action for their congregations (e.g., Crawford & Olson, 2001; Guth et al., 1997; Jelen, 2001 ), while conversations with friends from one's place of worship may also make or solidify these connections. Therefore, we also control for admonitions from either clergy or other local church leaders and friends from the local place of worship to vote in particular ways. We created dummy variables for clergy urging a Republican vote, clergy urging a Democratic vote, friends urging a Republican vote, and friends urging a Democratic vote (all coded 1 yes and 0 no).
These alternative mediators are sometimes related to respondents' closeness to the candidates (see Table 2 , columns 3, 6, and 9). More important for our purposes, however, is that controlling for these alternative mediators does not wash out the mediating role of religious media. Religious media users remain significantly closer to Bush and farther from Gore despite these additional mediators. However, the additional controls do reduce the religious media coefficient to insignificance for closeness to Buchanan.
We find similar patterns when looking at vote choice (see Table 3 Furthermore, even for traditionalists, religious media accounted for only some of the connection.
A Closer Look at Selection Effects
The results thus far show that religious media use and political behavior are related.
What they cannot show conclusively is whether these relationships are simply an artifact of selfselection, or if they indicate religious media's capacity to reinforce political predispositions or even to persuade individuals to alter their political attitudes and behaviors. The conservative balance of religious media's audience may reflect the fact that conservatives choose to seek out religious media for political purposes rather than any independent effect religious media might exert. We have already marshaled a good deal of indirect evidence that religious media do have an independent relationship with candidate evaluations and vote choice, finding that religious media users differed significantly from non-users with similar religious and political perspectives. Thus, for example, even among conservative Republicans, those who use religious media are more favorable toward and likely to vote for Republicans.
To further establish a causal link, we take advantage of the survey's pre-and post- What might account for such changes? Since religious media users claimed that religious media affected their votes, we know that one of the factors they encountered between the preand post-election waves was religious media. By comparing changes among religious media users to changes among non-users we are controlling for many of the other factors that might change individuals' views, so we are closer to isolating the effect of religious media use. In addition, any presidential campaign offers information from various sources that could change individuals' political views. These changes should be largely reflected in changes in party identification. If an individual encounters information during the campaign that makes him or her more supportive of Republicans, such effects may be evident in changes in the strength of party identification. Thus, by controlling for changes in party identification, we control for many of these effects, helping to isolate the effect of religious media. We also control for the other potential religious mediators included in the models above. If religious media is more than simply a proxy for conservative predispositions, it will continue to be related to closeness to Bush even after controlling for those pre-election predispositions and any new information encountered as captured by the change in party identification and other religious cues.
17 Table 4 shows that even after controlling for pre-election predispositions, change in party identification, and other factors that may mediate between religion and politics, religious media users became significantly closer to Bush, farther from Gore, and more likely to vote for Bush and Republican House candidates (closeness to Buchanan was not included in the pre-election wave). Note that whatever factors encouraged individuals to become more Republican also boosted closeness to Bush, the probability of voting for Bush and for Republican House candidates (but did not affect closeness to Gore). The significant point for our purposes is that controlling for these other changes does not wash out the effects of religious media use. We take this as evidence that selection effects are not entirely driving our results. Whatever else may be shaping individuals' views and choices over the course of the election, religious media seems to have at least reinforced their audience's conservative leanings, pushing them further in support of Republican candidates.
[ Table 4 about here]
To examine whether religious media have any power to persuade citizens, we examine political liberals. If individuals seek out information that reinforces existing predispositions, we might expect liberals who used religious media to have used media that would make them more favorably disposed toward Democrats and less favorable toward Republicans. However, as (data not shown). Throughout, religious media either had no effect or moved individuals away from their liberal predispositions.
[ Table 5 about here]
Finally, we examine black Protestants, a group that tends to be politically liberal, but fairly strongly relied on religious media (recall that 42% reported using religious media in making voting decisions). 18 
Discussion
Our analyses point to four conclusions. First, and most basic, around one quarter of the public claimed to rely on religious media when making voting decisions in 2000. Political scientists must not ignore a factor that reportedly reaches about half of the American public, about half of whom claim these media shape their voting decisions.
Second, religious media users were more conservative than non-users, in the sense of feeling closer to the more conservative political candidates and farther from Al Gore and being more likely to vote for Bush and Republican House candidates. Third, these findings appear to reflect more than simple self-selection effects. Although political conservatives and religious traditionalists who were already predisposed to support conservative and Republican candidates were most likely to be among the religious media users, over time those who did rely on religious media became more conservative than religious traditionalists and political conservatives who did not rely on religious media. Thus, religious media appear to reinforce conservatives' political predispositions, pushing them further into the Republican camp.
Furthermore, political liberals who relied on religious media also moved in a more conservative direction, suggesting that these media may have some power to move beyond reinforcing predispositions to some level of persuasion. Although some religious media outlets may convey liberal political messages, we could not uncover any significant independent political influence.
This set of findings does not add up to incontrovertible evidence that religious media make individuals more conservative. However, if religious media are not responsible for the effects we have observed, there must be something unique about those who rely on religious media for political cues other than their religious beliefs, behaviors, and affiliations, the political cues they encounter from their place of worship, and their political predispositions that causes them to seek out religious media and tend to support Republican candidates. We are hard pressed to think of some factor other than religious media that can account for these results.
Thus, we infer that religious media play some role in connecting religion to politics. far from the following individuals or groups" "George W. Bush" "Albert Gore" "Ralph Nader"
"Patrick Buchanan." Other individuals or groups were asked between each of the candidates.
Evaluations were coded so higher numbers are more favorable responses. Ideology: A seven-point scale ranging from "very liberal" (0) to "very conservative" (6).
Clergy Urge Republican/Democratic
Income: A nine-point scale ranging from less than $5,000 to $75,000 or more.
Party Identification: Seven-point scale, "strong Democrat" 0, "strong Republican" 6. but we opted to use these items because they were the only knowledge items in the survey and even this imperfect measure had a significant impact in several models. Including an imperfect control seems far better than omitted variable bias.
Place
Religious Media: Scale based on three questions. "I would like you to tell me if any of the following sources of information were very important, of some importance, or not at all important to your voting decision. Voting decision means not only who you voted for but also whether or not you decided to vote." "religious TV," "religious radio," and "religious publications" We coded responses 0, 1, and 2 with higher numbers indicating greater importance, and then added the items together (alpha = .85).
Secular Media: Scale constructed the same way the religious media scale was constructed, using "television news," "radio news," and "newspapers." Alpha = .52, which is quite low, but results are similar to those presented here if all three secular media items are included separately rather than as a scale.
Religious Group Classification
We employ the classification presented by Guth, et al. (2006) . It places individuals in religious traditions and divides the largest of those traditions into traditionalist, centrist, and modernist camps to capture the restructuring of these traditions that sociologists have described (e.g., Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988) . Respondents are placed into religious traditions based on theirresponse to the question "do you ever think of yourself as part of a religious tradition? For example, do you consider yourself as a Christian, Jewish, Muslim, other non-Christian, agnostic or atheist, nothing in particular, or something else?" Christians were then asked "which specific church of denomination is that?" Based on their stated affiliations, respondents were placed into religious traditions following the scheme set out in Kellstedt and Green (1993) , a scheme that has been used elsewhere (e.g., Layman 2001).
The groups within traditions were determined by measures of religious belief, religious behavior, and identification with religious movements. Nine belief items were combined to form an orthodoxy scale. The items include beliefs about the authority of the Bible, God's existence, life after death, the Devil's existence, evolution, standards of right and wrong, the importance of sharing religious faith with others, Jesus as the only way to salvation, and whether social problems would be solved if enough people were brought to Christ. For Catholics, the evolution item was replaced with belief in papal infallibility. Each item was scaled 0-1, with the most orthodox position coded 1. The items were added together and respondents with scores 0-4 were classified heterodox, 5-7 centrist, and 8-9 orthodox. Chronbach's alpha for this scale is .85 overall and .75 for Evangelicals, .78 for Mainliners, and .70 for Catholics.
Nine behavior items were similarly combined for a religious behavior scale. These items include church attendance, Bible reading, church membership, leadership in church, time spent in church outside worship services, small group involvement, contributing money to church or other religious organizations, praying, and volunteering with religious organizations outside the church. For Catholics, praying the rosary and going to confession replace the Bible reading and small group involvement items. Respondents with scores 0-1, 2-3, and 4-9 were classified as low, middle, and high behavior, respectively. Chronbach's alpha for this scale is .86 overall and
.81 for Evangelicals, .82 for Mainline Protestants, and .71 for Catholics.
Questions of whether respondents identified themselves with various religious movements were used to create three movement identification categories: sectarian, church-like, and no movement. Catholics who identified as religiously "traditionalist or conservative" were placed in the "sect" category, Catholics who identified as "liberal or progressive" were labeled "church-like," and Catholics who did not identify with these terms were placed in the "no movement" category. Protestants who thought of themselves as "fundamentalist," "evangelical," "Pentecostal," or "charismatic" Christians were placed in the "sect" category, while Protestants with "mainline" or "liberal or progressive" identifications were labeled "church-like."
Protestants who chose both sectarian and church-like movements were placed in the "no movement" group along with those who identified with none of these movements. For black Protestants, all the clergy and friend advocacy variables were dropped due to collinearity issues. + significant at p < .10; * significant at p < .05; ** significant at p < .01, two tailed test.
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hesitant to admit that religious media inform their political views, while others may have been influenced by religious media without realizing it. In both cases, individuals who really were influenced by religious media would be treated as though they were not, thereby under estimating religious media's impact. 6 To avoid intractable self-selection problems, we employ as dependent variables only items asked in the post-election wave. Finding a relationship between a pre-election attitude and reports of using religious media for voting decisions in the post-election wave may merely indicate that individuals with those attitudes sought out religious media. Although the culture wars thesis argues that divisions extend beyond voting behavior to positions on various hotbutton cultural issues, the survey did not include issue items in the post-election wave, limiting our analysis to voting behavior and candidate evaluation. 7 Guth, et al. (2006) further isolate a group of Evangelicals who were extremely orthodox and active, classifying them "hyper-traditionalist." For the sake of consistency, we do not isolate this particular group in the analyses reported below. However, doing so generates similar results to those we report. 8 For example, an individual may believe in God or pray on occasion, but not affiliate with a specific religious tradition or attend religious services. 9 In addition to those presented here, we estimated models that included separate measures of religious tradition and religious commitment . We also estimated models including distinct measures for belonging (religious tradition), behavior (summary scale of the frequency of church attendance, tithing, praying outside worship services, reading the Bible outside worship, and attending a small group (for non-Catholics) or church attendance, praying the rosary regularly, and going to private confession (for Catholics)-scales were rescaled to a 0-1 range), and belief (an additive scale based on a series of dummy variables with value one if individuals are "certain God exists," if they are "sure there is life after death" or "believe in life after death but have some doubts," if they believe the Bible is "the inspired word of God," if they strongly agree or agree that "belief in Jesus Christ is the only way to salvation," and if they strongly disagree or disagree that "all the great religions of the world are equally true and good"). We also used a religious guidance question as an indicator of religious belief to tap general religious belief rather than Christianity-specific beliefs. All results mirrored those presented here. 10 In terms of the composition of the group of religious media users, traditionalist Evangelicals account for a third of all religious media users and almost half of those who rely most on religious media (data not shown). Black Protestants account for over 15 percent of religious media users and over 10 percent of those depending most on religious media. As expected, pure seculars account for a slim portion of religious media users (2 percent) and the largest portion of those depending more on secular media (15 percent).
11 Religious media use is also related to party identification, with 1 in 3 strong Republicans and 1 in 4 weak Republicans relying to some extent on religious media, compared to 1 in 5 strong or weak Democrats. 12 We also analyzed closeness to Ralph Nader, but do not present the results to make the table a bit more readable. Almost no religious variables were significantly related to closeness to Nader, including religious media use. 13 These models only include those who claimed to have voted.
14 These marginal effects were estimated by CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, & King, 2003) . 15 We also found that those who depended more on religious media than secular media were especially close to Bush and Buchanan and were significantly more likely to vote for Bush and Republican House candidates. Those who relied equally on religious and secular media and those who relied more on secular media felt closer to Gore. suggest that Southerners may be especially receptive to religious appeals. However, controlling for southern residence made no difference in the results.
Furthermore, interactions between religious media use and southern residence were statistically and substantively insignificant, suggesting that religious media use is not uniquely related to politics in the South 16 We also explored an item asking how important "mail from religious groups" was in voting decisions. This item is vague since we do not know what such mail entails. It could be quite similar to "religious publications" included in our religious media scale. On the other hand, such mail may be sufficiently different to include this item as another potential mediator. Empirically, the items are closely linked. The "mail from religious groups" item correlates with each of the religious media items at .60 or higher and correlates with the religious media scale at .73. In fact, if we include the "mail from religious groups" item in the religious media scale, the alpha coefficient is roughly the same and the results we report are quite similar. If we consider "mail from religious groups" as evidence of interest group activity, which could be an additional mediator, we find that such mail is often significantly related to the dependent variables and often decreases the impact of the religious media scale. Because of the vague question wording, we opted to omit this item from the results we present. However, some of our analyses suggest that religious interest groups may be important in mediating the relationship between religion and political behavior (e.g., Guth, et al., 2002) and possibly even the relationship between religious media and political behavior. 17 Ideally, we could include variables that capture the change in all of our independent variables. Unfortunately, the study did not include most of the variables in both waves. Only party identification was included in both. However, when controlling for all the other independent variables (not their changes), including exposure to secular media sources and all the religion variables, the results were similar to those we report.
